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3. Whether the blood sample drawn from the defendant 
and the results of the testing of that sample were properly 
admitted into evidence# and if not# whether the defendant's 
failure to object to the admission of that evidence at trial 
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4. Whether expert opinion testimony regarding the speed 
of the defendant's vehicle was properly admitted into evidence. 
5. Whether the defendant was denied effective 
assistance of counsel at trial. 
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I 
I I IE STATE OF UTAH, 
PIaInti £ f/Responac 
v s» 
r.RF.GOPY RAYMOND WIGHT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
(Priority No. 2) 
Statement of the Case 
defendant, Gregory Raymond Wight, was charged with 
Section 76-5-207, Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). 
The defendant was convicted of Automobile Homicide 
third degree felony, .esser 
held June :.he Second Judicial District Court, 
County, State of Uta!
 |(I the Honorable Douglas I • , 
Cornaby, Judge, presiding. The defendant was sentenced by Ji u ige 
Cornaby July 8, 1986, enn of imprisonment not to exceed 
fi 6 y i llii1 mi illi Prison, and to pay restitution in 
the amount $5,315.00. 
The defendant petitioned ' Third Judicial District 
Court 
Wight v. Gerald Cook, Civil * September 
?~*2 
the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, found that the defendant had 
been denied his right to appeal by the failure of his attorney 
to perfect the appeal, and that he should be resentenced in order 
to afford him the opportunity to perfect his appeal, pursuant to 
State v, Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1980). 
The defendant was resentenced on October 6, 1987, to 
the same sentence as had initially been entered. The defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied on November 20, 
1987, by the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby. The defendant then 
filed the appeal which is presently before the Court. 
Statement of the Facts 
At approximately 1:00 a.m., or shortly thereafter in 
the early morning of November 17, 1985, Victor Mark Pearce was 
driving home after a date, travelling northbound on Redwood Road, 
a two lane highway in the south end of Davis County. (T. 23-24, 
54) Some distance behind Pearce, and also travelling northbound, 
was Reid Neilsen, a 61 year old lifetime truckdriver, headed home 
after work in his private pickup truck. (T. 24, 57-60) Pearce 
was travelling at about 55 miles per hour. (T. 25) 
Pearce noticed a vehicle coming towards him at what he 
estimated to be also around 55 miles per hour. (T. 37) This 
vehicle drifted completely into Pearce's lane, swerved back into 
its own lane, just barely missing a collision with Pearce's 
vehicle, and then drifted back into the oncoming lane, colliding 
head-on with Reid Neilsen's vehicle, killing Neilsen. (T. 24-26, 
28-30, 177) Pearce looked into his rearview mirror and saw a 
flash of light, and then noticed that both the headlights of Reid 
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Neilsen's vehicle and the tai 1 1 i ghts of the car wl li ch 1 lad nearly 
struck him had vanished urned around and drove 
11iii I-, , ti i M I i H I i 11 i m i I I n I "i«" I *ed. (" 
Pearce, who had received EMT training, checked the 
drivers. Neilsen died within minutes. The defendant, Gr egory R. 
Wight, was tl: :ie :I:i :i « i • n c: £ I: .1 I = c: 1:1 :II= i c < • 1 :i :i c :] e il , ; '5 76, 
13 3, 144) 
The accident wa investigated by Utah Highway Patrol 
officers, who determined * . * : - , , i 
Neilsen's lane of trave northbound) : 'it the 
def end«--< : avelling about 71 miles per hour 
just before impact <9) 
The defendant was extricated from his vehicle with 
i iJiS ](Jei 'ill If 1 1 f I j ,1 M l I I W " * I I I I H'i }inr;|, i f * 1 ii (\1 ) t ' 
Lake City. (T MM M I I lit di Highway Patrol Trooper Steve 
Bythewa^ id - \tv scene of the collision, went to LDS 
Hospitr Df a .i i a] coho] i c be \ rex age 
the defendant's breath, placed him under arrest, ( I l 34- -135) 
He then directed Kathy Burns, a certified blood-draw technician, 
lit) t ake .ii h l u o d sample f r o m I lit> dt'Iein l an l (T l i ' i , IMi) The 
blood sample was drawn at 3:30 a.m. (T. 146, 150) 
Tlic sample was analyzed by Bruce Beck toxicologist 
with the State Health Laboratory, by means r, 
found t contain .20 percent alcoho] weight 
•r counsel 
concerning his testing procedures, , ) as w H 
the body's absorption rate for alcohol under various 
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circumstances, the rate alcohol is eliminated from the 
bloodstream, the amounts of beer a person would have to consume 
to reach the .20 percent level quickly, or over a longer period 
of time, and other factors, such as drinking on a full or empty 
stomach, and the effects of blood loss and IV solutions on the 
blood alcohol level. (T. 294-304) The bottom line was that an 
adult male of the defendant's approximate size would have to 
consume roughly 18 cans of 12 ounce beer over a period of seven 
hours in order to reach a .20 percent level. (T. 302) 
The defendant and his friend, Rick Millen, each 
confirmed that the defendant had in fact purchased and consumed 
an extensive amount of alcohol over the course of the day and 
evening before the accident. (T. 71, 334-35, 359-60) The 
defendant's estimate was that he had consumed "at least 10 beers, 
and possibly more" (T. 335). 
Summary Of The Argument 
1. The defendant's prior conviction for aggravated 
robbery was properly admitted into evidence for impeaching his 
credibility as a witness. 
2. The trial was not rendered unfair due to any juror 
bias, as none existed. 
3. The blood sample drawn from the defendant and the 
result of the testing of that sample were properly admitted into 
evidence. 
4 
4. The expert opinion of the ^peed of the defendant's 
vehicle was properly admitted, and was supported by the 
defendant's own testimony. 
5. The defendant was not denied effective assistance 
of counsel, but rather was represented by very able and very 
effective counsel. 
Argument 
POINT I 
THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE FOR IMPEACHING HIS CREDIBILITY AS A 
WITNESS. 
The defendant claims that the denial of his pretrial 
motion to exclude evidence of his prior bonviction for aggravated 
robbery, a felony, denied him a fair trial. 
j 
The defendant was convicted of Aggravated robbery, a 
felony, in 1977, sentenced to the Utah S^ate Prison on February 
28, 1978, and paroled on March 11, 1980. 
The defendant, during direct examination 
(R. 127, 128, T. 2-4) 
at trial, chose to 
briefly describe the circumstances. He said that he and another 
person "stole money" because they "need [ed]M it. (T. 352) 
Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence provides that 
evidence of a prior conviction may be admitted w[f]or the purpose 
of attacking the credibility of a witness," only where the prior 
crime: 
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment 
in excess of one year under the law under 
which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweights its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or 
(2) involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment.1 
In the present case, either or both of the alternatives 
of Rule 609 would allow admission of the prior conviction. Under 
the first alternative, the aggravated robbery conviction was a 
crime punishable by more than a year's imprisonment, and the 
trial court did engage in a weighing process, balancing the 
probative value of the evidence against its prejudice to the 
defendant. (T. 2-7) 
Equally important is the fact that the trial court made 
clear to the jury the very limited purpose for which evidence of 
the prior conviction had been admitted. Jury Instruction 31 told 
the jury, regarding the prior conviction, that 
... the fact of conviction is one that you 
may take into consideration in weighing his 
testimony and determining his credibility. 
It must not be used for any other purpose, 
and, particularly, you should bear in mind 
that conviction of the defendant of a crime 
at some previous time is no proof that he is 
quilty of the offense with which he is now 
charged. (R. 63.) 
"I Rule 609 also requires that, for such evidence to be 
admissible, it must have been no more than ten years 
since the date of the conviction or of 
the release of the witness from the 
confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date 
In the present case, the defendant's 1977 conviction was nine 
years prior to the trial date of June 12, 1986, and his parole 
from prison on the offense was just over six years prior to the 
trial, so the ten-year rule is not in issue. 
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It is clearly recognized in Utdh that felonies, even 
those not involving dishonest or false Statement, can be 
probative of the veracity and credibility of a witness, including 
a defendant. That is why Rule 609(a) aljlows evidence of such. 
(See also Section 78-24-9, which requires a witness to answer to 
a prior felony conviction, and State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 
(Utah 1986), where the Supreme Court setfs out factors applicable 
in the weighing process.) 
Secondly, Rule 609 requires th^ Court to admit evidence 
of prior convictions involving "dishonest or false statement," 
and allows no discretion or balancing by the Court in such an 
instance. 
The defendant's trial counsel iven conceded this to the 
trial court while arguing the matter. Counsel stated, "And 
while I would be the first to admit thai such a crime would go to 
a person's honesty and trustworthiness, I think under the 
circumstances of this case where it has nothing to do with along 
those lines, it would be far more prejudicial than probative. 
(T. 2) 
It is true, as defendant points out, that some of the 
federal circuit courts have held that theft, burglary, and 
attempted robbery do not, in their view| involve dishonesty or 
false statement for purposes of Federal! 
weight of the authority across the country still clings to the 
old fashioned idea that stealing is dishonest. U.S. v. O'Conner, 
635 F.2d 814 (C.A.N.M. 1980) (transportation of stolen goods 
Rule 609. However, the 
involves dishonesty and is admissible to impeach); State v, 
Holtcamp, 614 SW2d 389 (Tenn. Cr. App.)(stealing involves 
dishonesty and is admissible to impeach - prior shoplifting 
conviction); Dodson v. State. 536 So.2d 878 (Fla. App. 1978) 
(theft is universally regarded as reflecting on a person's 
veracity); State v. Trafton, 425 A.2d 1320 (Maine 1978). State 
v. Bucklin, 304 NW2d 452 (Iowa 1981). Daniels v. State, 408 NE2d 
1244 (Ind. 1980), People v. Malone, 397 NE2d 1377 (111. 1979), 
and Lowell v. State, 574 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1978) (all holding 
theft to be a crime of dishonesty and therefore admissible to 
impeach). 
Furthermore, jurisdictions who have faced the issue have 
specifically held that robbery and aggravated robbery do involve 
dishonesty and are therefore admissible to impeach the 
credibility of a witness, including a defendant. U.S. v. 
Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049 (U.S. App. D.C. 1983) (five year old 
armed robbery conviction involved dishonesty and was admissible 
to impeach); State v. Day, 577 P.2d 878, appeal after new trial 
617 P.2d 142, cert, den. 101 S. Ct. 163, 66 L. Ed.2d 77 (N.M. 
1978) (robbery clearly involves theft, which is dishonest); 
People v. Holman, 356 NE2d 1115 (111. App. 1976) (robbery, armed 
or otherwise, is probative of veracity, and is properly admitted 
to impeach a testifying defendant); and Alexander v. State, 611 
P.2d 469 (Alaska 1980)(robbery is a crime of dishonesty and is 
admissible to impeach a testifying defendant). 
Most important, however, is the clearly stated position 
of the Utah Supreme Court, that a prior conviction of "theft is 
8 
admissible since it obviously involves 'dishonesty.'"2 State 
i 
v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 33 (Utah 1984). Albo, Terry v. ZCMI, 605 
P.2d 314, at 324 (Utah 1979)(fn. 36, "Any crime involving the 
theft of another person's property is generally considered as 
involving dishonesty.") It would be ridiculous to suggest that 
one who merely steals the property of another may have that fact 
used to attack his credibility, but if he adds to the stealing 
the element of force, threat, or violencje, his credibility will 
be protected from attack by the law. 
Clearly evidence of the defendant's prior conviction was 
properly admitted by the Court at trial .J 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN CONTINUING WITH THE 
TRIAL AFTER DISCOVERING THAT ONE JUROR HAD 
BEEN ACQUAINTED WITH THE DECEASED'S WIFE SOME 
YEARS AGO. I 
The defendant contends that he should be granted a new 
trial because it was discovered, after the opening statement of 
the prosecutor, that a juror had at one time been acquainted with 
the wife of the victim. 
At request of defense counsel after the prosecutor's 
opening statement, the Court asked if arty of the jurors knew the 
deceased. (T. 15) The following dialogue occurred: 
2 There is no question that the defendant's conduct in committing 
the aggravated robbery involved a theft* As pointed out above, 
his own testimony at trial was that he $nd his co-conspirator 
••stole money" because they Hneed[ed] iti" (T. 352) Indeed, the 
defendant's characterization of that crime to the jury was as if 
it had been a mere theft, involving no Violence. No instruction, 
testimony, or argument ever mentioned any violence, force, 
threats, or use of weapons having been involved in that incident. 
9 
THE COURT: Does anybody know the person who 
is deceased? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Yes. I don't know him 
personally. I know his wife. I did not 
connect any of this prior to his statement up 
here, but I do know his wife, but I do not 
know him personally. 
THE COURT: In what capacity? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Before they moved to 
Centerville, they lived about a block and a 
half from us. 
THE COURT: Closely associated with them? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: No. Just through the 
church. 
THE COURT: Belonged to the same ward? Is 
that what you are saying? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Yes. 
THE COURT: You understand what I said 
earlier about the obligation to be fair and 
impartial jurors. The fact that you know the 
deceased, would that have anything to do with 
that? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: I don't know. It 
wouldn't. 
THE COURT: You will be fair and impartial? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: Okay. (T. 16, 17) 
1. The defendant and his counsel were given an 
opportunity to discuss whether or not they had any objections to 
proceeding with the jury as impanelled, and thereupon chose, as a 
matter of strategy, to proceed without objection to the jury 
impanelled, and thereby waived any objection. (Transcript in the 
case of Wight v. Cook, pp 35-36, 48-50, 61-63.) 
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2. Even had a proper and timely objection been made as 
to the jury impanelled, it should not have been granted, as the 
juror was not biased and could not have fceen dismissed for cause. 
The proper test for determining whether a juror should be excused 
for cause was stated by the Utah Supreme|Court in the case of 
State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (1984): 
A Juror who has formed "strong and deep 
impressions which will close the mind against 
the testimony that may be of feared in 
opposition to them; which willjcombat the 
testimony and resist its forcer1 should be 
excused for cause. j 
Such was simply not the case in the present instance. 
The mere fact that a juror is acquainted with a victim, 
witness, or the defendant is not grounds for excusing that juror 
and does not deny the defendant a fair t^ial. State v. Clayton, 
514 P.2d 720 (Ariz. 1973)(fact that jurot was acquainted with 
murder victim and his family for many years as business people 
was not cause to dismiss juror); State v. Baran, 474 P.2d 728 
(Utah 1970)(fact that juror lived in samb neighborhood as 
defendants estranged wife, was not cause to excuse juror); State 
v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22 (Utah 1984)(fact that a juror went to high 
school with detective on the case not catise for excusing juror) . 
The case of State vs. Jones, 52 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 
(1987), cited by the defense, is easily distinguishable from the 
case at bar. There, two jurors in a murder case were involved 
and "stated that they knew members of [tr 
that their associations would effect theS 
at 39.) One of the jurors stated specifically that her 
he victim's] family and 
ir impartiality." (Id., 
11 
particular "association would make her evaluation of some of the 
evidence difficult because she saw [the victim's sister] at work 
every day," but "she 'hoped' she could base her decision in the 
case solely on the evidence introduced at trial." (Id.) The 
other juror in Jones stated that her associations with family 
"would have a definite effect" upon her decision in the case, and 
that she had discussed the murder with the victim's father and 
sister, had been to the viewing of deceased's body, and "would 
expect the defendant to prove his innocence because of what she 
knew about the case." (Id.) 
The situation in the case at bar is not even close to 
Jones. The deceased's wife was not a witness and did not 
testify. She was not involved in the collision which took her 
husband's life, nor was she present during the investigation. 
The juror here did not have a close or even a current association 
with the deceased's wife. She did not even recognize that the 
case involved a person she knew of until after hearing the 
opening statement of the prosecutor. The juror not only stated 
that she would "absolutely" have no bias against the defendant, 
but the verdict given underscored that assertion, as the jury 
had ample evidence upon which to convict the defendant of a 
second degree felony as charged, but instead convicted him of the 
lesser included third degree felony. 
POINT III 
THE BLOOD SAMPLE DRAWN FROM THE DEFENDANT AND 
THE RESULT OF THE TESTING OF THAT SAMPLE WERE 
PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
12 
The defendant asserts that the blood sample drawn from 
his body and the result of testing perfdrmed on that sample 
should not have been admitted into evidence. He complains that 
a) the defendant was not properly arrested at the time of the 
blood draw because he was unconscious at; the time, b) the blood 
was not drawn within two hours of the drjiving, and c) no 
"foundation" existed for admission of th(e blood sample or test 
result. 
First, the defendant did not object to the admission of 
the blood sample or to testimony as to tjhe results of testing of 
that sample. A failure to timely object} results in a waiver of 
that objection. 
Second, the blood sample was prfoperly drawn, properly 
tested, and properly admitted into evidence, even had an 
objection been made. 
1. The defendant claims that tfhe arrest by Trooper 
Steve Bytheway did not comply with the litah statutes. The 
defendant was properly arrested, and Ut^h Code Section 76-5-
207(6) gave the officer authority to haye the blood drawn with or 
without the defendant's consent, as the officer had "reason to 
believe that the victim may die." 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 
1826, 16 L. Ed.2d 908 (1966), the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the actions of a police officer |n requiring a suspect to 
submit to a blood test where the officeij had probable cause to 
arrest the person for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Schmerber, like the defendant here, had been arrested at a 
13 
hospital while being treated for injuries sustained in an 
automobile accident, and his blood was drawn at the hospital 
under the direction of a police officer, over Schmerber's 
refusal. The Supreme Court held that no violation of Schmerber#s 
constitutional rights had occurred, either under the due process 
clause (384 US, at 759), the privilege against self-incrimination 
(384 US, at 765), or the right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures (384 US, at 772). 
Furthermore, even had an arrest not been effected due to 
the defendant's supposed unconsciousness,^ the officer still had 
clear statutory authority to have the blood drawn. Utah Code 
Section 41-6-44.10, the "implied consent law," discusses the 
authority of a police officer to direct the administration of 
chemical tests for blood alcohol content when the officer has 
grounds to believe the person was driving a vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicants. Subsection (3) provides that: 
Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in 
any other condition rendering him incapable 
of refusal to submit to any chemical test or 
tests is considered to not have withdrawn 
the consent provided for in Subsection (1), 
and the test or tests may be administered 
whether the person has been arrested or not. 
The defendant's brief alleges that the defendant was 
unconscious at the time of the blood draw, but that allegation is 
not supported by the record. Neither Trooper Bytheway, nor Kathy 
Burns, nor the defendant were ever asked specifically about the 
defendant being unconscious when the blood was drawn. That was 
simply not in issue at trial. 
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The drawing of blood under such conditions has also 
passed constitutional muster. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 US 
432, 1 L. Ed.2d 448, 77 S. Ct. 408 (1957), the suspect had been 
involved in an automobile accident in which other persons were 
killed, and was taken unconscious to a hospital. When the smell 
of alcohol was detected on the suspect's breath, a highway patrol 
officer directed the drawing of a blood sample. The Supreme 
Court held that the blood draw from the iinconscious suspect 
violated no constitutional rights. j 
The defendant cites this Court's decision in In the 
Interest of I.,R.L., 61 Utah Adv. Rep. 48 (C.A. 1987), where 
blood was drawn from a suspect who was never arrested, even 
though probable cause existed. However, I.,R.L. is a different 
situation completely. There, the suspect was conscious and 
lucid, and was capable of refusing submission to testing. Under 
those circumstances, where subsection (3) of 41-6-44.10 clearly 
did not apply, the only way the police could have properly 
administered a chemical test was to have arrested the suspect, 
which they failed to do. 
In the present case, the police conduct was proper 
whichever of the two procedures is applicable. In I.,R.L., the 
police did not follow either procedure properly. 
2. The fact that the blood may not have been drawn 
within two hours of the driving does not render the test results 
inadmissible. Utah Code Section 44-6-44.5(2) specifically states 
that a test result is admissible even when the sample was taken 
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more than two hours after the driving. The trier of fact simply 
determines what weight to give the result of such a test. 
3. The defendant claims a lack of "foundation" for 
admission of the blood sample and test results, but fails to 
state specifically what is lacking. 
Trial testimony established that the blood was drawn 
from the defendant by Kathy Burns, a trained, experienced, 
certified, blood-draw technician; she drew two tubes of blood 
from Gregory Raymond Wight at LDS Hospital in the presence of 
Trooper Steve Bytheway. Kathy Burns testified that she 
immediately numbered the two tubes, put them in a packet, sealed 
the packet with tape, and watched as she had Trooper Bytheway 
sign the seal, took the sealed packet to her home and placed it 
in a locked container in the refrigerator, and kept it there 
until the afternoon of November 21st, when she personally took it 
to the state Health Lab and delivered it directly to Bruce Beck. 
It was still sealed and had not been opened when she delivered it 
to Bruce Beck. (T. 150-153.) Bruce Beck testified that when he 
received the packet directly from Kathy Burns on November 21st, 
it was still sealed. He stated that he immediately put his 
laboratory number on the envelope with his initials, then placed 
it in the refrigerator in a locked evidence room at the lab. 
Later that same day, Bruce Beck, a trained, experienced 
toxicologist, opened the packet, removed and two tubes of blood, 
and performed an analysis for blood alcohol content, receiving a 
result of 0.20 percent ethanol alcohol. He then replaced the 
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tubes into the envelope and resealed it with his own tape. (T. 
279-285.) 
It is difficult to see what othfer "foundation" the 
defendant expected. 
Finally, even had some error occurred in the admission 
of the blood sample and test result, such an admission would have 
been harmless error. The net effect of the blood testing was to 
establish that the defendant had consumed a considerable amount 
of alcohol before getting behind the wheel of his vehicle. The 
defendant and Rick Millen both established the same fact through 
their testimony. Even absent the blood knalysis testimony, the 
evidence overwhelmingly supported the vepdict rendered. 
POINT IV 
THE EXPERT OPINION OF THE SPEEb OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, 
AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE DEFENDANT'S OWN 
TESTIMONY. 
The defendant claims that the trial court erred in 
admitting the expert testimony of Highwa^ Patrol Officers 
Ericksen and Dahle, that the speed of the defendant's vehicle 
just prior to the collision was approximately 71 miles per hour. 
It should first be noted that the defendant fails to 
state how this testimony prejudiced him. The defendant's own 
testimony was that the last time he checked his speedometer he is 
one hundred percent sure it said just under 55 miles per hour. 
(T. 362) This was just before he started downhill from the top 
of the overpass. (T. 363) Shortly thereafter, and after 
narrowly missing Pearce's vehicle when tie noticed Reid Neilson's 
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headlights approaching, he stepped on the accelerator "all the 
way to the floor,lf and then the crash occurred. (T. 314, 369-70) 
Thus, the fair inference from the defendant's own 
testimony is that, his speed just prior to impact was apparently 
something in excess of 55 miles per hour. Beyond that fact, the 
precise speed was not an important part of the evidence. 
Excessive speed was not argued by the prosecutor as a factor 
supporting the negligence element. (T. 375-84, 397-401) 
Trooper Ericksen was nevertheless properly qualified by 
the trial court as an expert witness for purposes of giving an 
opinion as to speed from a critical speed scuff and as to point 
of impact of a collision. The trial court was very meticulous 
and thorough in requiring the state to establish sufficient 
foundation as to Trooper Ericksen's qualifications as well as the 
facts upon which he based his opinion. Trooper Ericksen had 
completed not only the basic accident investigation course given 
to all traffic officers, but intermediate and advanced courses 
as well, and had investigated approximately 75 accidents, about 
10 of which involved the critical speed scuff. (T. 173, 193) 
Additionally, Trooper Ericksen's testimony was underscored by the 
testimony of Highway Patrol Officer Robert Dahle, the instructor 
of the accident investigation courses, a man of such extensive 
training and experience that the defendant does not question his 
qualifications as an expert. (T. 245-250) All of Officer Dahle's 
testimony was based on measurements already in evidence prior to 
Officer Dahle taking the stand. (T. 198, 249) 
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The critical factor in determining whether an expert 
should be qualified to testify as such, is simply whether, by way 
of "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" (Rule 
702), the person possesses specialized knowledge which will 
assist the trier of fact in resolving trie issues of fact in the 
case. Wessel v. Ericksen Landscaping C6., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 
1985). Furthermore, it is a longstanding holding of the Utah 
Supreme Court that a considerable amount of discretion is granted 
to the trial judge in passing on the qualifications of an expert 
witness to testify on a particular subject matter. Wessel, 
supra; Maltby v. Cox Constr. Co. Inc., ^98 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979); 
Batt v. State, 503 P.2d 855 (Utah 1972). And expert testimony 
regarding the determination of a vehicle's speed by means of 
markings on the roadway was specifically approved by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Johnson, 414 P.2d 575 (1966). 
Also in Taylor, as in the case at bar, precalculated 
charts were also used by the expert in Calculating the speed of 
the vehicle. Rule 703 specifically allqws an expert witness to 
rely on facts or data known to him and if they are lfof a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or 
data need not be admissible in evidence" (emphasis added). The 
Utah Supreme Court approved such an apprtoach even before Rule 703 
was adopted in Utah. In State v. Claytqn, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1982), the Court stated: 
The clear trend in the law of evidence is 
toward the position expressed in the Federal 
Rules with regard to the allowable base for 
the testimony of experts. We find nothing to 
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preclude the use of that standard in Utah... 
once the expert is qualified by the court, 
the witness may base his opinion on reports, 
writings or observations not in evidence 
which were made or compiled by others, so 
long as they are of a type reasonably relied 
upon by experts in that particular field. 
The opposing party may challenge the 
suitability or reliability of such materials 
on cross-examination, but such challenge goes 
to the weight to be given the testimony, not 
to its admissibility. 
Trooper Ericksen was properly qualified as an expert for 
the very limited aspects of accident reconstruction to which he 
testified, and his testimony was based on his own personal 
observations of the accident scene, the vehicles involved, 
markings on the roadway, and measurements, and was clearly 
admissible. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANT HAD COMPETENT, THOROUGH 
REPRESENTATION BY VERY ABLE COUNSEL AND WAS 
NOT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL. 
The defendant next complains that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel, primarily because his attorney 
didn't make enough objections. (Appellant's brief, p. 31) The 
standard of review applicable to this issue and cited by the 
defendant is found in State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 
1982). The applicable principles stated by the Court in Malmrose 
are: 
1. ••[TJhe defendant bears the burden of establishing 
ineffectiveness" of counsel. Id., at 58. 
2. "The proof must be demonstrable, not speculative.11 
Id. 
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3. •• [T]he courts will not second guess 'legitimate 
exercise of judgment as to trial tactics or strategy.'•• Id. 
4. ,f[T]here is no prejudicial error warranting reversal 
of the conviction unless better representation is likely to have 
produced a different result." Id. 
During his testimony in the post-conviction hearing, 
Wight v. Cook, the defendant's trial counsel explained the trial 
strategy which he and the defendant took? 
Q. You have heard Mr. Wight testify and I 
think while you were out of thfe courtroom, 
Mrs. Wight testified that they felt you were 
not making enough objections during the 
trial. Was anything ever brought to your 
attention by either Mr. or Mrs. Wight that 
there were things they wanted you to object 
to that you were not objecting| to? 
A. No. I explained that sometimes with 
certain evidence, certain juries, that you 
can appear obstreperous in trying to keep 
them from hearing the whole truth, and so I 
thought it was a wise move. s6 I explained 
it to them and got their approval to the 
phenomenon that I am going to make sure that 
we keep out all objectional material, but we 
are not going to object every time we have a 
remote possibility of the Court sustaining. 
And so as far as I was concerned, I objected 
every time it was meaningful. There never 
was a discussion of not objecting enough of 
(sic) you are not doing it. (transcript in 
the case of Wight v. Cook, p. 39) 
In applying the principles of M^lmrose to the actual 
performance of the defendant's trial coujnsel, the defendant has 
fallen far short of establishing his burden of showing that 
counsel was ineffective. The defendant has not raised any 
complaints of his counsel's decisions which did not involve a 
very legitimate exercise of judgment on trial strateav. and 
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certainly none of those decisions, if made differently# can be 
said to have been likely to have produced a different result. 
The defendant first claims counsel was constitutionally 
inadequate for failing to object to the presence on the panel of 
the juror who had had some acquaintance with the deceased's wife. 
This argument must fail unless the defendant could show that 1) a 
challenge for cause of that juror would have been sustained, if 
made, and that 2) the decision by counsel not to object to that 
juror's presence on the panel was not simply a matter of 
strategy. Neither is the case. (See the discussion of this in 
Point II above, and the transcript in the case of Wight v. Cook, 
pp. 35-36, 48-50, 61-63) 
The defendant's claim of prejudice due to trial 
counsel's supposed failure to object to the blood sample and test 
results must fail for the same reasons. 
The defendant next attempts to take one single statement 
of his trial counsel out of context to claim that counsel was 
unprepared for the trial. In discussing preliminary matters with 
the Court in chambers, defense counsel asked about the Court's 
procedure for posing questions to the jury venire. The Court 
asked counsel, "Do you have some?" Counsel replied, "I haven't 
had them written down because I have an incest case next week and 
a rape case the next week and I have been going wild." (T. 9.) 
A similar statement could be made at the outset of a trial by any 
attorney with a moderate practice at any given time. To 
transpose such a statement into a declaration of being 
inadequately prepared for trial is ludicrous, particularly when 
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the only result of counsel's busy schedule was that he didn't 
reduce to writing his proposed questions to the jury venire. 
Furthermore, a few moments later in open court, the 
Court specifically asked defense counsel, "Mr. Walsh, are you 
ready to proceed for the defendant?" Cqunsel replied, lfWe are, 
your Honor." (T. 10.) The thorough anq meticulous cross 
examination of the State's witnesses thdt followed, as well as 
objections and presentation of the defertse witnesses by defense 
counsel, easily put to rest any questiori of counsel's being 
unprepared. 
Finally, the defendant attempts to criticize his trial 
counsel for "allowing" the medical examiner to testify as to 
facts not in evidence. 
Again, this claim is not supported by the record. The 
prosecutor began supplying the witness with certain evidence 
which had been given by other witnesses, at which time defense 
counsel objected: 
MR. WALSH: Your Honor, I am cooing to object 
to this. It's one thing for Counsel to give 
the expert witness hypothetical information 
and it's another thing for him to comment on 
what the evidence is and garnish the 
evidence, if you will, by the process which 
he is relaying information to the doctor. 
THE COURT: I think I am going to sustain the 
objection, but I think you are asking, I 
assume, what is a hypothetical question, so 
you have to assume it's hypothetical and make 
suggestions rather than saying this is what 
the evidence shows. I 
Q (By Mr. Harward): Assume, then the 
following -
MR. HARWARD: Your Honor, is ^ he prior—must 
I start over or can I take in what I have 
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already asked and consider it part of an 
assumption? 
THE COURT: That's right. 
(T. 266). 
The prosecutor then proceeded to state a hypothetical question to 
the witness which was quite accurately in harmony with the 
testimony of prior witnesses. 
The fact of the matter is, defense counsel made a 
proper objection to the prosecutor's question, which was 
sustained; the prosecutor changed the form of his question to a 
proper form, which was properly allowed by the Court. Every 
aspect of the prosecutor's hypothetical question was an accurate 
recounting of facts already in evidence. 
In short, the defendant is literally grasping at straws 
in attempting to find fault with the manner in which he was 
represented during the course of the trial. His claim of 
inadequate counsel is certainly not a meritorious issue for which 
any relief should be granted. 
Conclusion 
The defendant has failed to state any claim for which 
relief should be granted on appeal. He was given a fair trial, 
in the hands of an unbiased, properly selected jury of his peers; 
he was represented by very able and conscientious defense 
counsel of his own choosing; the verdict arrived at by the jury 
was based on the evidence presented at trial, which evidence was 
properly admitted and presented to the jury, and the jury's 
verdict was just. 
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The defendant's consumption of alcohol and his negligent 
driving while under the influence of a great amount of alcohol 
caused the death of an innocent man. These facts were proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt in a fair trial. The defendant's 
conviction and sentence should be affirmed, and his claims on 
appeal denied. 
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ADDENDUM 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
26 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.5 (1953, as amended) 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove 
that a person was operating or in actual physical control of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or with a 
blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the 
results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 41-
6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the 
alleged driving or actual physical control the test result is 
admissible as evidence of the person's bliod or breath alcohol 
level at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical 
control, but the trier of fact shall detepaine what weight is 
given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving 
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath 
alcohol level or drug level at the time o£ the alleged operating 
or actual physical control. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44.10(1)(a) and (3) 
(1)(a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is 
considered to have given his consent to a chemical test or tests 
of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining 
whether he was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, or while under thi influence of alcohol, 
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any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the 
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that 
person to have been operating or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of alcohol, 
any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
* * * 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other 
condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit to any 
chemical test or tests is considered to not have withdrawn the 
consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or tests may 
be administered whether the person has beeh arrested or not. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-207 
(1)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a felony of the 
third degree, if the actor operates a motor vehicle while having 
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight, or while 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which renders the 
actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent11 means simple 
negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which 
reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar 
circumstances. 
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(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a felony of the 
second degree, if the actor operates a mo^or vehicle while having 
a blood alcohol content of .08% or greater! by weight, or while 
under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree which renders the 
actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the 
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally 
negligent manner. 
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "qriminally negligent" 
means criminal negligence as defined by subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by 
Section 41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of 
chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6-44.5, apply to 
determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this 
action. 
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. 
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is 
on or has been legally entitled to the alctohol or a drug is not a 
defense to any charge of violating this section. 
(6) Any chemical test is admissible in accordance with the Rules 
of Evidence if administered on a defendant: (a) with his consent; 
or (b) without his consent after his arrest either under this 
section or under Section 41-6-44 where th$ officer has reason to 
believe that the victim may die. 
(7) For purposes of this section "motor vehicle" means any self-
propelled vehicle and includes, but is not limited to, any 
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automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, 
aircraft. 
engine, watercraft, or 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-24-9 (1953, as amended) 
A witness must answer questions legal and bertinent to the matter 
in issue, although his answer may establish a claim against 
himself; but he need not give an answer which will have a 
tendency to subject him to punishment for & felony; nor need he 
give an answer which will have a direct tendency to degrade his 
character, unless it is to the very fact ih issue or to a fact 
from which the fact in issue would be presumed. But a witness 
must answer as to the fact of his previous! conviction of felony. 
Rule 609(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(a) General rule. 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted 
if elicited from him or established by public record during 
cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under 
which he was convicted, and the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence! 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2] 
or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 
(b) Time limit. 
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a 
period of more than ten years has elapsed pince the date of the 
outweighs its 
I) involved dishonesty 
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conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement 
imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date unless 
the court determines, in the interests of justice, that the 
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and 
circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
However, evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as 
calculated herein, is not admissible unless the proponent gives 
to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent 
to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair 
opportunity to contest the use of such evidence. 
Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence 
The facts or data in the particular case uion which an expert 
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made 
known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming 
opinions or inferences upon the subject, tpe facts or data need 
not be admissible in evidence. 
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